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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 20000428-CA 
v. : 
JOHN LEGG, JR., : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a sentence entered on a guilty plea to Attempted Receiving 
or Transferring a Stolen Vehicle, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 
41-la-1316(2) (1999), 76-4-101 (1999), and 76-4-102(3) (1999); Burglary of a Building, 
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1999); and Aggravated 
Assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1999), in the 
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable J. Dennis 
Frederick, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(c) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issue: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to three 
consecutive indeterminate prison terms of zero-to-five years, where it considered all 
legally relevant factors, including the gravity of the crime, his twelve-year criminal 
history, his extended drug addiction, and his proven inability to conform himself to 
societal norms? 
Standard of Review: "The imposition of sentence 'rests entirely within the 
discretion of the [trial] court, within the limits prescribed by law."' State v. Schweitzer, 
943 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citations omitted). "As such, '[an appellate 
court] review[s] the sentencing decisions of a trial court for abuse of discretion.'" Id. 
(citing State v. Houk, 906 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)). An appellate court may 
find an abuse of discretion "only if [it] concludes that 'no reasonable [person] would take 
the view adopted by the trial court.'" Id. (citing State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 
(Utah 1978)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statute is reproduced in Addendum A. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (1999). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with receiving or transferring a stolen 
motor vehicle, burglary, unlawful possession of a controlled substance, aggravated 
assault, failure to respond to officer's signal to stop, third degree felonies; and criminal 
mischief, theft, and interference with a peace officer making an arrest, class B 
misdemeanors. R. 2-5. 
Following a preliminary hearing, the trial court bound defendant over on all counts 
but burglary and theft. R. 20-23. Defendant asked for a second preliminary hearing 
which the trial court granted. R. 30-34. At the second preliminary hearing, the burglary 
charge was amended to burglary of a building, and defendant was bound over on all 
charges. R. 45-46. Defendant filed a motion to quash the bindover, which included a 
transcript of the second preliminary hearing. R. 52-114. Evidence presented at the 
second preliminary hearing detailed the gravity and circumstances of the charged 
offenses. See generally R. 68-114. 
Pursuant to plea negotiations, defendant pleaded guilty to the following three 
reduced charges: one count of attempted receiving or transferring a stolen motor vehicle, 
one count of burglary of a building, and aggravated assault, all third degree felonies. 
Defendant was sentenced to three consecutive statutory, indeterminate terms of 
zero-to-five years. R. 137-38; 158:8-9. Defendant timely appeals his sentence. R.142-
43. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Crimes 
On the afternoon of May, 21, 1999, Officer Mike Hamideh was working off-duty, 
in uniform, as a security guard at Rocky Mountain Raceway when he noticed a red 1995 
Lexus enter the parking lot. R. 4, 86. The car had a red emergency light on its top, 
similar to those used on unmarked police cars. Id. As the car entered the main gate, 
Officer Hamideh noticed that it was profusely leaking oil onto the staging lane. R. 87. 
He immediately recognized the oil as a danger to the racing cars, and that the red light 
was for use only on emergency vehicles. R. 4, 86-88. He approached the car to inform 
the driver of his concerns. R. 89. 
As he approached the car, Officer Hamideh recognized defendant as the driver. R. 
88. He remembered defendant from a previous police encounter two days earlier. Id. 
The car bore a Lowbook Sales advertisement plate, and no valid license plates or other 
registration. R. 89. Officer Hamideh suspected the car was stolen. R. 89-90. 
Through the open driver's side window, Officer Hamideh asked defendant who 
owned the car. Id. Defendant answered that his parents leased it for him through their 
business. R. 90. Upon Officer Hamideh's request to see the registration, defendant 
produced a green sheet of paper. Id. The paper appeared to be a lease agreement from an 
individual named Pearlstine out of Phoenix, Arizona. Id. A check on the vehicle 
identification number revealed that the car was not registered in either Arizona or Utah. 
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R. 91. 
Officer Hamideh asked defendant to turn off the vehicle. Id. Defendant ignored 
Officer Hamideh's request, staring straight ahead. Id. Defendant began moving the car, 
turning it around to face a nearby crowd of between sixty to eighty spectators. R. 92-93, 
96. Officer Hamideh followed along the driver's side, ordering defendant to turn off the 
car. Id. In response, defendant locked the driver's door and began to roll up the window. 
R. 93. Officer Hamideh blocked the window and again ordered defendant to turn off the 
car. Id. Defendant asked to exit the car, but was told to remain and turn off the engine. 
Id. Without turning off the car, defendant rolled the window down. Id. Officer Hamideh 
called for back up. Id. 
Defendant then pushed the gas pedal to the floor, loudly revving the engine. R. 
93-94. Fearing for the safety of the crowd directly in front of the car, Officer Hamideh 
lunged inside the open driver's side window, and attempted to turn off the ignition 
switch. R. 93,106. With Officer Hamideh hanging from the car, defendant slapped the 
gear shift into drive, causing the tires to spin. R. 93-94. As the car accelerated, Officer 
Hamideh instinctively held on to defendant's head to keep from slipping under the rear 
tires. R. 94-95, 106. Defendant aimed the car toward a large cement barrier, attempting 
to swipe Officer Hamideh from the side of the car. R. 94. Before the car reached the 
barrier, Officer Hamideh managed to push himself free. R. 95. He rolled away from the 
car, as defendant raced off toward the pit area and almost hitt a security guard. R. 95, 108. 
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Officer Hamideh suffered scrapes on his calves and right hand. R.95. 
Shortly thereafter, the car was found abandoned next to Lindsay and Sheryl 
Strasburg's motor home. R. 95-96. Ms. Strasburg entered her motor home and spotted 
defendant lying on the floor, wearing her husband's shirt. R. 71-72. Defendant begged 
her not to reveal him to police. R. 72. Ms. Strasburg left her motor home and informed 
her husband that defendant was inside. R. 73. Mr. Strasburg opened the door and saw 
defendant still lying on the floor. R. 80-81. Defendant ordered Mr. Strasburg to let him 
leave, and then ran out. R. 81. Officer Hamideh spotted defendant and, after a brief 
struggle, took him into custody. R. 98. A visual search of the car revealed drugs. R. 96-
97. The car was later found to have been stolen from Low Book Auto Sales. R. 99. 
Sentencing 
Prior to sentencing the court ordered, received, and reviewed defendant's PSI. R. 
158:2. The PSI contains defendant's twelve-year adult criminal history, and discusses, in 
detail, defendant's character, mental health and drug history. R. 157:7-10, 12-17. 
Defendant was convicted and sentenced as an adult for business burglary, aggravated 
assault, disorderly conduct, criminal mischief theft, criminal mischief aggravated assault, 
trespassing, theft, violating probation, burglary, assault, theft by receiving, criminal 
trespass, aggravated burglary, domestic assault, violating a protective order, escape from 
custody, criminal mischief, receiving a stolen vehicle, and failure to respond to an 
officer's signal. R. 157:7-10. Several of those offenses were repeat convictions 
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including aggravated offenses, burglary, assault, theft, and criminal mischief. Id. The 
PSI also extensively examined defendant's probation and parole history, revealing that 
defendant violated probation on three occasions. R. 157:7-8, 11-12. In prison, defendant 
was disciplined by the Prison Disciplinary Board eighteen times for offenses including 
inciting disorder and dealing contraband (disciplined three times). R. 157:7-10. While 
awaiting sentencing for the present offense, defendant was disciplined twice for 
destroying jail property and was sentenced to one year of probation for assaulting a 
prisoner. R. 157:10. Defendant has a twenty-one year history of drug use, including daily 
use of marijuana and methamphetamine. R. 157:15. While confined in prison, defendant 
has used and sold drugs. R. 157:9. Defendant was using methamphetamine when he 
committed the present offense. R. 157:4, 15; 96-97. 
At sentencing, defendant recognized that he would receive a prison sentence, but 
requested that he be allowed to participate in drug therapy program and that his sentences 
run concurrently. R. 158:5-6. The court listened to statements by defense counsel and 
defendant, pertaining to defendant's character and criminal history. R. 158:3-7. Then, 
faced with defendant's lengthy criminal history and the gravity of his crimes, the court 
imposed its sentencing order: 
It is the judgment and sentence of this Court that you serve the term 
provided by law in the Utah State Prison of zero to five years for each of the 
three separate Third Degree Felony crimes to which you pled guilty. 
Mr. Legg, had it been something other than the serious risk that you 
placed on the officer who was seeking to do his duty here, which could 
have resulted in his death rather easily, quite frankly; had it been something 
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other than that - and I don't ascribe to you a malevolent intent to do harm to 
this specific officer. But the nature of the conduct was such that it was 
absolutely and totally out of control, Mr. Legg. And the mere fact that the 
officer survived this with injuries no greater than he received was 
fortuitous. It had nothing to do with your conduct. 
That sort of conduct, Mr. Legg, whether you are grieving for the loss 
of a son or strung out on drugs, is absolutely unacceptable. And you 
understand that, of course. So, the consequence of all of it is that you must 
now pay your debt. 
It is my order that you serve the terms consecutively and not 
concurrently, Mr. Legg. 
I will recommend that while you are at the Utah State Prison you 
receive substance abuse therapy to the extent that you are able to get it. I 
hope that it does you some good. 
Good luck to you. 
R. 158:8-9. A copy of the sentencing transcript is attached in Addendum B. 
ARGUMENT SUMMARY 
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to 
consecutive prison terms without considering all legally relevant factors. The record 
demonstrates otherwise. The sentencing court was presented with mitigating and 
aggravating information from the PSI, the testimony given in defendant's preliminary 
hearing, and statements made by defense counsel and defendant at sentencing. Thus, it is 
clear from the record that the sentencing judge duly considered the gravity and 
circumstances of the offense, together with the history, character, and rehabilitative needs 
of defendant 
Imposing consecutive sentences, was not an abuse of discretion in view of the fact 
that defendant nearly seriously injured a police officer, and because of his long-standing 
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drug addition, twelve-year criminal history, and proven inability to conform himself to 
societal norms. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CONSIDERED ALL LEGALLY 
RELEVANT FACTORS IN IMPOSING CONSECUTIVE 
PRISON TERMS, THEREFORE, IT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION 
Defendant claims that the sentencing court did not adequately consider statutorily 
prescribed factors relevant to consecutive sentencing under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 
(1999). Br. of Aplt. at 10. The record refutes defendant's claim. 
A. A trial court has broad discretion in sentencing. 
"The imposition of sentence 'rests entirely within the discretion of the [trial] 
court, within the limits prescribed by law.'" State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1997) (citations omitted). "As such, '[an appellate court] review[s] the 
sentencing decisions of a trial court for abuse of discretion.'" Id. (citing State v. Houk, 
906 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)). "To do otherwise would have a chilling effect 
on the trial court which has the main responsibility for sentencing." State v. Gerrard, 584 
P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978); accord Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 651. 
As stated, when a defendant has pleaded guilty to multiple felony offenses, the trial 
court may impose concurrent or consecutive sentences. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1). 
In determining whether or not to impose consecutive sentences, the trial court must 
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"consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the history, character, and 
rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (4).1 A trial court 
does not abuse its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences unless it fails to consider 
the statutory factors or if the sentencing is otherwise inherently unfair or clearly 
excessive. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 651. Moreover, "[an appellate court] may find an 
abuse of discretion only if [it] concludes that 'no reasonable [person] would take the view 
adopted by the trial court.'" Id. (citing Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887). 
Section 76-3-401(4) requires only that the court consider the factors noted above, 
not that it give them equal weight. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4); see also State v. 
Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985) (Although a sentencing judge will give 
considerable weight to the circumstances of the crime, a judge may also consider other 
factors.); State v. Nutall, 861 P.2d 454, 458 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion by placing more emphasis on punishing defendant rather than 
rehabilitating him"). As such, "the exercise of discretion in sentencing necessarily 
lUtah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1999), provides: 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more 
than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences 
for the offenses. Sentences for state offenses shall run concurrently unless the 
court states in the sentence that they shall run consecutively. 
(4) A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and 
the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determining 
whether to impose consecutive sentences. 
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reflects the personal judgment of the court/' which endeavors to impose "a proper 
sentence based on the facts and law before it." Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887. 
B- The trial court properly considered all legally relevant sentencing factors. 
Defendant argues that the trial court did not consider the statutory factors under 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4) because it did not specifically mention each factor in 
pronouncing sentence. Br. of Aplt. at 13. The trial court, however, was not required to 
specifically mention each statutory factor in imposing sentence. Rather, when the record 
shows that the trial court had before it information regarding the requisite factors, it is 
assumed that the those factors were considered. See Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 651-52. 
In Schweitzer this Court held that a sentencing court properly considered the 
factors listed in section 76-3-401(4), where evidence of those factors was presented to the 
court through defense counsel's arguments, defendant's statements, the PSI, and other 
record evidence.2 Id. at 652. Schweitzer argued, as defendant does here, that the trial 
abused its discretion in sentencing him to consecutive indeterminate prison terms because 
it did not mention the statutory factors in pronouncing sentence and therefore, necessarily 
did not consider those factors. Id. at 651-52. This Court rejected that argument on the 
ground that the information before the trial court clearly outlined and described 
2When Schweitzer was decided, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4) (1999) was 
codified as Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(3) (Supp. 1996). Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 651. 
The 1997 amendment merely renamed 76-3-401(3) as 76-3-401(4). See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-401(4) (1999). No significant differences between the former and present 
subsections of the statute exist. Id. 
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defendant's history, character and rehabilitative needs as well as the gravity and 
circumstances of his offenses. Id. The record also contained mitigating information 
favoring Schweitzer's requests for rehabilitation. Id. This Court held that because all this 
information was before the trial court, it appropriately considered all legally relevant 
factors in sentencing Schweitzer to consecutive indeterminate prison terms.3 Id. at 652-
53. 
In the present case, as in Schweitzer, all mitigating information was presented to 
the trial court through the preliminary hearing, the PSI, defense counsel's arguments at 
sentencing, and defendant's own statement at sentencing. Indeed, defendant concedes 
that these sources presented "all mitigating information" to the trial judge. Br. of Aplt. at 
13-14, note 1. 
Testimonial evidence was put before the trial court through the preliminary hearing 
transcript included as an addendum to defendant's motion to quash the bindover. R. 52-
114. The sentencing judge reviewed that motion and the accompanying preliminary 
hearing transcript. Id. That transcript contains the testimony of Officer Hamideh and the 
other victims, detailing the gravity and circumstances of defendant's offenses. R. 68-114. 
3Defendant attempts to distinguish Schweitzer by offering slight factual differences 
between that and this case. Br. of Aplt. at 13-14, note 1. Although there are some 
insignificant factual differences between the two cases, the rule of law set forth in 
Schweitzer for indeterminate consecutive sentencing, precisely and correctly counters 
defendant's arguments. Compare Br. of Aplt at 10-14 with Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 651-
53. 
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Officer Hamideh expressed his fear that defendant was intentionally driving toward a 
cement barrier, attempting to crush him between the car and the barrier. R. 94; 157:5. 
After barely escaping serious injury, Officer Hamideh saw defendant nearly hit a security 
guard as the car sped off. R. 95. Defendant's apparent loss of control also endangered a 
crowd of between sixty to eighty spectators. R. 92-93, 96. 
The PSI also provided detailed information regarding the gravity and 
circumstances of defendant's offenses, as well as his history, character, and rehabilitative 
needs. See generally R. 157. The PSI reveals that defendant's lengthy criminal history 
includes 41 separate offenses spaning twelve years, including such felonies as aggravated 
assault on a police officer, business burglary, aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, 
theft, receiving a stolen vehicle, failure to respond to an officer's signal and criminal 
mischief. R. 157:7-10. That history shows that defendant is a repeat offender for his 
present crimes. Id. He has also been disciplined by the Prison Disciplinary Board 
eighteen times. R. 157: 7-10. While awaiting sentencing for the present offense, 
defendant was disciplined twice for destroying jail property and sentenced to one year of 
probation for assaulting a prisoner. R. 157:10. The PSI also includes statements from the 
victims and notes defendant's drug addiction and his request for rehabilitation. R. 157:15. 
At sentencing, the trial judge listened as defense counsel presented the court with 
mitigating information in requesting a drug treatment program and concurrent sentencing. 
R. 158:3-7. Defense counsel's argument detailed defendant's criminal history, character 
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and rehabilitative needs, and highlighted the circumstances of defendant's offenses. Id. 
Additionally, defendant gave a statement in which he presented the court with similar 
mitigating circumstances. R. 158:8. 
Because, as defendant concedes, information detailing all legally relevant factors 
was before the trial court, the court appropriately considered all the evidence in 
sentencing defendant to consecutive indeterminate prison terms. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 
652-53. Moreover, in view of defendant's lengthy criminal record and the gravity of his 
crimes, it cannot be said that "no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the 
trial court." Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in imposing consecutive prison terms.4 
'Defendant compares the instant case to State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998). 
Br. of Aplt. at 8-12. Defendant offers Galli for the proposition that a trial court must give 
"adequate weight" to the mitigating factors set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4). 
Br. of Aplt. at 8, 11-12. Galli is inapposite. First, Galli's sentence differs radically from 
defendant's. Galli was sentenced to three consecutive indeterminate terms of five years to 
life. Galli, P.2d at 932-33. Therefore, Galli's minimum prison sentence was fifteen years. 
Here, defendant was sentenced to three terms of zero-to-five years, therefore his 
minimum sentence is still zero. R. 137-38; 158:8-9. Thus, defendant's indeterminate 
sentence cannot be properly compared to Galli's sentence. Second, Galli had virtually no 
prior criminal history, whereas defendant's criminal history spans twelve years. Galli, 
967 P.2d at 938. R. 157:7-10. Third, Galli had shown that he was a potentially good 
candidate for rehabilitation. Galli, 967 P.2d at 938. Defendant's history, including his 
recidivism and misbehavior in prison, shows that he is a poor candidate for rehabilitation. 
R. 157:7-10. 
Defendant also cites State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1993), and State v. 
Smith, 909 P.2d 236 (Utah 1995) to support his argument. Br., of Aplt. at 10. But "both 
those cases involved consecutive sentences for serious offenses in which the defendants 
were sentenced to serve a minimum of twenty-four and sixty years, respectively, before 
being eligible for parole, due to minimum-mandatory sentence requirements. Both the 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm 
defendant's consecutive sentence. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^&^y of January, 2001. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
\ COLEMERE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Strunk and Smith courts reversed those sentences, reasoning that the imposition of 
consecutive rather than concurrent sentences infringed upon the Board of Pardon's duties 
to monitor a defendant's progress and abrogated the board's flexibility to parole a 
defendant earlier." State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 652 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 
(distinguishing Strunk and Smith). See Strunk, 846 P.2d at 1301-02; Smith, 909 P.2d at 
244-45. Here, as stated, defendant's minimum sentence is zero; therefore the Board of 
Pardons has complete freedom to parole him whenever it deems appropriate. 
Accordingly, both Strunk and Smith are inapposite to the instant case. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
76-3-401 UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
PART 4 
LIMITATIONS AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS ON 
SENTENCES 
76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences — Limita-
tions — Definition. 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more 
than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences 
for the offenses. Sentences for state offenses shall run concurrently unless the 
court states in the sentence that they shall run consecutively. 
(2) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively 
if the later offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole 
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing 
would be inappropriate. 
(3) If an order of commitment does not clearly state whether the sentences 
shall run consecutively or concurrently, and the Board of Pardons and Parole 
has reason to believe that the later offense occurred while the person was 
imprisoned or on parole for the earlier offense, the board shall request 
clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request, the court shall enter 
an amended order of commitment stating whether the sentences are to run 
consecutively or concurrently. 
(4) A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and 
the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determining 
whether to impose consecutive sentences. 
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a 
single criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
(6) (a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of 
all sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as 
provided under Subsection (6)(b). 
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if: 
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the 
death penalty or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or 
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on 
conduct which occurs after his initial sentence or sentences are 
imposed. 
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant: 
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense; 
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which 
were committed prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or 
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the 
present sentencing court or by a court of another state or federal 
jurisdiction, and the conduct giving rise to the present offense did not 
occur after his initial sentencing by any other court. 
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect 
of consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the 
Board of Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been 
committed for a single term that shall consist of the aggregate of the validly 
imposed prison terms as follows: 
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the 
maximum sentence is considered to be 30 years; and 
PUNISHMENTS 76-3-401 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum 
term, if any, constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum 
terms. 
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concur-
rently with the other or with a sentence presently being served, the lesser 
sentence shall merge into the greater and the greater shall be the term to be 
served. If the sentences are equal and concurrent, they shall merge into one 
sentence with the most recent conviction constituting the time to be served. 
(10) This section may n6t be construed to restrict the number or length of 
individual consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity 
of any sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually 
served under the commitments. 
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to 
impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases. 
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned* means sentenced and committed 
to a secure correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has 
not been terminated or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of 
where the person is located. 
History: C. 1953, 76-3-401, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-401; 1974, ch. 32, § 7; 
1989, ch. 181, § 1; 1994, ch. 13, § 21; 1995, 
ch. 139, § 1; 1997, ch. 283, § 1; 1999, ch. 275, 
§ 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-
ment, effective May 1, 1995, added Subsection 
(2) and redesignated the following subsections 
accordingly. 
The 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997, 
added Subsections (3) and (12), redesignating 
the other subsections accordingly, and made 
stylistic changes. 
The 1999 amendment, effective May 3, 1999, 
subdivided Subsection (6), added Subsection 
(6Xb)(ii), and made related changes; substi-
tuted "of the defendant's initial sentence" for "of 
sentence for any one or more of them" in Sub-
section (7 Kb); added "and the conduct giving 
rise to the present offense did not occur after 
his initial sentencing by any other court" at the 
end of Subsection (7)(c); added "When the limi-
tation of Subsection (6)(a) applies" at the begin-
ning of Subsection (8); and made stylistic 
changes. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ) 
) 
Pla in t i f f , ) 
) 
- v s - ) Case No. 991910690FS 
) 
JOHN LEGG, J R . , ) SENTENCING, 4 -14 -00 
) 
D e f e n d a n t . ) ) 
BE IT REMEMBERED t h a t on t h e 1 4 t h day of A p r i l , 2000 , 
t h i s c a u s e came on f o r h e a r i n g b e f o r e t h e HONORABLE J . DENNIS 
FREDERICK, D i s t r i c t C o u r t , w i t h o u t a j u r y i n t h e S a l t Lake 
County C o u r t h o u s e , S a l t Lake C i t y , U t a h . 
A P P E A R A N C E S : 
For t h e S t a t e : JOHN JOHNSON 
Deputy D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y 
For t h e D e f e n d a n t : DAVID V. FINLAYSON 
Deputy Lega l Defender 
From v i d e o by : BILLIE WAY, CCT 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
MR. FINLAYSON: And I also have John Legg. That's number 
23,1 think. 
THE COURT: okay, 23 on the calendar, State of Utah v. 
John Legg, Jr.; Case No. CR99-690. Mr. Finlayson appearing on 
behalf of the Defendant. Mr. Scott--
MR. JOHNSON: This is my case Judge. John K. Johnson. 
THE COURT: All right, Mr. Johnson. 
Are you John Legg, Jr.? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, SIT. 
THE COURT: Mr. Finlayson, here is your lawyer; is that 
correct? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: This matter is on the calendar for 
sentencing. The Defendant entered a plea of guilty on the 4th 
of February of this year to the Third Degree Felony charge of 
Attempted Receipt of a - or Transfer of Stolen Vehicle; Third 
Degree Felony burglary and Third Degree Aggravated Assault. 
The Court - this Court then ordered and has now received 
and reviewed the Presentence Report in this matter. 
Mr. Finlayson, you've seen that report; have you not? 
MR. FINLAYSON: Y e s , Y o u r H o n o r . 
THE COURT: is there any legal reason known to you why I 
should not impose sentence at this time. 
MR. FINLAYSON: No, there is not. 
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THE COURT: Before I do so, do you wish to say anything on 
behalf of Mr. Legg? 
MR. FINLAYSON: Yes, Your Honor, I do have a few brief 
comments. You know, I was not provided with any sort of 
documentation on Mr. Leggs' juvenile history and neither was 
the Court. And I would ask that any references to his juvenile 
history on his Matrix be stricken. I've talked with Mr. Legg. 
As Your Honor knows, those juvenile rap sheets have numerous 
incidents on them, and some of them are simply coming back to 
see the judge again. Mr. Legg does not remember having that 
significant of a juvenile history, and we weren't provided with 
that. I would ask that those be stricken. 
THE COURT: Yeah, my dealing here with Mr. Legg is going 
to be based on his conduct as an adult. 
MR. FINLAYSON: okay. Thank you. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. FttJLAYSON: Then on his adult record, Judge, there's a 
few corrections that we need to make: On the first page, it's 
- oh, actually, mine is a faxed page. I don't know — 
THE COURT: Page 7? 
MR. FiNfLAYSON: page 7. He does have - he only has one 
prior felony. It's this business burglary that he was sent to 
prison on. That's the only prior felony that Mr. Legg has in 
his history. This Aggravated Assault that's shown here in '87 
was a Class A Misdemeanor. That's why it is the one year out 
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to the (inaudible) prison. And so that is not a Felony. 
And he only had one other felony, Fleeing conviction which 
was reversed on appeal some time later. He did spend two years 
in prison on that case before it was reversed, but it was 
reversed on appeal and dismissed. And so that is the only 
felony he has. 
Any - and what they ~ they also have on Page 8 down 
under "6-14 of '95," they have got an "Aggravated Burglary." 
That case was disposed of. It was a Domestic Assault. It was 
his - Mr. Legg's own house, and so it was disposed of as a 
Domestic Assault. And he does not have an Aggravated Burglary 
charge, either. 
So, a number of these incidents on his adult history are 
warrants that have come back up, and I just wanted to make sure 
the Court was clear on what his adult history rerlly is. He 
has one prior felony that he went to prison on. He went to 
prison on another felony that was reversed on appeal, Felony 
Fleeing, and that's it. 
That brings us to this case, Judge. I -- now, Mr. Legg 
has been my client for about a year now. It took about a year 
for this case to go through because the court, one of the -
Judge Quinn's court had a technical problem with the 
preliminary hearing, so we had to go back for the preliminary 
hearing. It's taken quite quite awhile to resolve, and 
Mr. Legg has been in jail the whole time. 
STATE V. JOHN LEGG, JR. uonoenscu 
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1 Mr. Legg admits that he has a significant drug problem, 
2 and his history shows that as well. He's never had a program, 
3 Judge. Never in - in his history, has he had a program that 
4 has addressed his drug problem. And, obviously, you know, 
5 going to prison on his first felony back in ' 88, the prison 
6 does not address - really address that problem, either. They 
7 basically put you out there, and then you they might give you 
8 some aspirin-type therapy before you are released back on the 
9 street. But he's had a significant drug problem for a long 
10 time. He recognized that. And I - as I've represented 
11 Mr. Legg, he - he was difficult to deal with to begin with. 
12 And he's had a year in jail to think about what his history has 
13 been, to think about what happened in this incident, having 
14 drugs in his system and creating a situation where this officer 
15 could have been hurt or somebody else could have been hurt. 
16 THE COURT: Or killed. 
17 MR. FINLAYSON: Or killed by taking off from the officer. 
18 THE COURT: Yes. 
19 MR. FINLAYSON: He certainly never intended to hurt 
20 anybody in that situation, and, luckily, the officer wasn't 
21 injured badly. You know, the -- the facts were pretty clear 
22 that he was taking off as the officer grabbed him and kind of 
23 hung onto the car. And I don't think - and it was based on a 
24 recklessness situation, and he understands that. 
25 But he is - from the time that I've represented him, Your 
J Page 
1 Honor, he's completely broken as a person. He does not have an 
2 attitude towards the system anymore. He does not have an 
3 attitude towards authority that he did when I first met him. 
4 And he has a markedly different outlook on where he wants to go 
5 from here. And I say that, Your Honor, because - not because 
16 Mr. - Mr. Legg is asking you for probation. He understands 
7 that be has very little chance at probation based on his 
8 history. He knows that he's going out to the prison. But I 
9 think he is somebody who - his three felony convictions on 
10 this case all arose out of this same incident in a very short 
11 period of time, and one of them arose out of him simply trying 
12 to escape from the police officers and going into this motor 
13 home and taking somebody's shirt, and that was the burglary of 
14 the building. 
15 We would ask, Your Honor, because of the nature of this 
16 case and because Mr. Legg does not have a significant history, 
117 as it seems in his report, that you would consider concurrent 
18 sentences on his - on these three different felony charges. 
19 He has - his Matrix - the point system - they've got - they 
120 - o n his Criminal History Assessment at the end of the - of 
21 the Criminal - of his Presentence Report, it should be 12 
22 points without - without dealing with the juvenile history, it 
23 should be 12 points. He should be in a Category 4 instead of a 
24 Category 5. He's going to spend a significant time in prison 
li« oimarfv hist on one underlying offense. And we'd ask because 
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1 of the nature of this case, because of his spending a year in 
2 jail so far on it, because the circumstances all arose out of 
3 this very brief meeting with the officer, that you would impose 
4 these sentences concurrent. And we'll submit it, Your Honor. 
5 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Finlayson. 
6 Mr. Legg, before I decide what to do here, do you have 
7 anything to say? 
8 THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, I'd like to add that before this 
9 incident occurred, I had lost a baby boy. The (Inaudible). 
10 And I've been out of prison for quite a long time. I served a 
11 five-year sentence, a zero to five. I've never been on parole. 
12 And I kind of just fell off my wagon and got strung out on 
113 drugs. And I don't even know why I stopped at the Bonneville 
14 Raceways or did anything that I did. I just - 1 was - we 
15 haven't had a boy in my family for (Inaudible) years. And 
16 there was a boy, and he died at eight months' old. And it just 
17 - it just killed me. And after that - all I got to say is: 
18 I - I've been out there trying to prove myself as a 
19 responsible citizen after doing all of that time in prison. 
20 And this incident occurred, I lost my mind. I wasn't in my 
121 ordinary state of mind when this occurred. And like 
22 Mr. Finlayson said, I didn't mean to hurt nobody. It was just 
23 a matter of circumstances that took place at the time. 
24 That's all I have to (Inaudible). 
! 25 THE COURT: All right, Mr. Legg. 
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1 Mr. Johnson, what's the State's position - let me first 
2 inquire: Arc there any victims or victim representatives that 
3 wish to be heard? 
4 MR. JOHNSON: There are not 
5 THE COURT: All right, Mr. Johnson. 
6 MR. JOHNSON: Judge, normally I would submit this on a 
I 7 presentence repeat, but I think in this circumstance I'd like 
8 to speak and strongly urge the Court for incarceration, that be 
| 9 for a very long time. Under of the guise of methamphetamine, 
110 Mr. Legg became a one-man crime spree. And there were a lot of 
111 people that were injured as a result of what he did, by his 
J12 actions. 
13 And in looking at this version of the incident, there's no 
114 responsibility; none whatsoever. And had this not happened, 
115 Judge, I think this would be an excellent script for a Keystone 
16 Comedy. I mean, it's slapstick all the way. But the fact is 
17 it did occur. I think anything short of a long prison term for 
18 Mr. Legg will allow him to come back into the community and 
19 reoffend 
20 We'd submit it on that 
21 THE COURT: very well, Mr. Johnson. 
22 There being no legal reason why I should not impose 
23 sentence, I shall should do so at this time, Mr. Legg. 
24 It is the judgment and sentence of this Court that you 
25 serve the term provided by law in the Utah State Prison of zero 
Oin.JLJ2 v . JVJiin i-»juvjvj, J I V . w u u w u o v n 
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1 to five years for each of the three separate Third Degree 
2 Felony crimes to which you pled guilty. 
3 Mr. Legg, had it been something other than the serious 
4 risk that you placed on the officer who was seeking to do his 
5 duty here, which could have resulted in his death rather 
6 easily, quite frankly; had it been something other than that -
7 and I don't ascribe to you a malevolent intent to do harm to 
8 this specific officer. But the nature of the conduct was such 
9 that it was absolutely and totally out of control, Mr. Legg. 
10 And the mere fact that the officer survived this with injuries 
111 no greater than he received was fortuitous. It had nothing to 
12 do with your conduct. 
13 That sort of conduct, Mr. Legg, whether you are grieving 
14 for the loss of a son or strung out on drugs, is absolutely 
15 unacceptable. And you understand that, of course. So, the 
16 consequence of all of it is that you must now pay your debt. 
17 It is my order that you serve the terms consecutively and 
18 not concurrently, Mr. Legg. 
19 I will order that you pay restitution in the amount of 
20 $ 1,500 that was incurred by the victims of your crimes here. 
21 I will, as I am bound to do, give you credit for the 314 
22 days that you've now served in custody towards the ultimate 
23 service in these matters. 
24 I will recommend that while you are at the Utah State 
25 Prison you receive substance abuse therapy to the extent that 
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1 you are able to get it. I hope that it does you some good. 
2 Good luck to you. 
3 (Hearing adjourned.) 
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